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We are living in a troubled time. Across the political spectrum, there is a great 
deal of concern that government offi­
cials have been derelict in honoring 
their oaths to support and defend the 
Constitution. 
In such an environment, we 
should expect an uptick in constitu­
tional litigation. And sure enough, 
many high-profile constitutional 
cases are making their way through 
the courts. 
For example, from the left, there 
are challenges to the president's im­
migration and voter-fraud crack­
downs, and also to his compliance 
with the Constitution's emoluments 
clauses. From the right, there are 
lawsuits alleging that some of the le­
gal protections recently extended to 
members of the LGBTQ community 
violate constitutionally protected reli­
gious liberty 
It is therefore worth asking 
whether, in a time when many believe 
that the political branches have gone 
off the rails, the courts can save us. 
Answering this question requires 
us to consider the extent to which the 
Constitution contemplates judicial 
remedies for constitutional violations. 
The answer is surprisingly compli­
cated. 
Any discussion of the topic begins 
with Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
where the Supreme Court first exer-
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cised the power of judicial re­
view - the practice of having 
courts decide whether laws 
passed by legislatures and 
acts committed by executive 
branch officials violate the 
Constitution. 
In one of Marlmry's most 
famous passages, Chief Jus­
tice John Marshall justified 
judicial review by stating: 
"The Government of the 
United States has been em­
phatically termed a govern­
ment of laws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to de­
serve this high appellation if 
the laws furnish no remedy 
for the violation of a vested le­
gal right." 
Essentially, Marshall was 
saying that a person's rights 
aren't worth much unless the 
government provides a rem­
edywhen they have been vio­
lated. And in all but the rarest 
circumstances, individualized 
remedies must come from 
courts. 
So, Marshall argued, ifwe 
are committed to enforcing 
the Constitution, we must 
also commit ourselves to hav­
ing courts decide the consti­
tutionality of the work product 
of the other branches of gov­
ernment, and to craft appro­
priate remedies in response 
to perceived constitutional vi­
olations. 
First-year law students 
quickly learn that Marshall's 
line of argument is more con­
testable - at least as a matter 
of logic - than it may first ap­
pear. Nonetheless, the prac­
tice of judicial review is a key­
stone of our constitutional 
system. 
That said, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that the 
Constitution requires every 
violation of one of its provi­
sions to invite a successful 
court action. Rather, despite 
Marlmry, there are many sit­
uations where courts with­
hold remedies for constitu­
tional violations. 
First and foremost, courts 
will entertain constitutional 
claims only from persons who 
have standing, which means 
that they have been injured in 
some unique and individual­
ized way by government con­
duct. 
A person may be outraged 
by the president's decision to 
restrict immigration from cer­
tain Muslim-majority coun­
tries, or by Colorado's statute 
barring businesses from 
denying service to same-sex 
couples. But such outrage is 
not enough to permit the per­
son to file suit. 
Rather, any lawsuit must 
be filed by someone person­
ally affected by the contested 
policy, such as a person 
whose Syrian relatives will be 
excluded from the country, or 
a business that is compelled 
to bake a wedding cake for a 
same-sex marriage ceremony. 
And sometimes, it is difficult 
to find a litigant who has been 
harmed in a personalized way 
by unlawful government con­
duct. The pending litigation 
regarding emoluments, for 
example, raises difficult 
standing issues. 
Moving on, let's say there 
is a litigant with standing to 
assert a constitutional claim. 
Even so, and even ifthe 
claim has merit, there are 
many situations where a 
court will deny a remedy. 
Roughly speaking, the law 
ofjudicial remedies for consti­
tutional violations differenti­
ates between situations 
where litigants complain 
about a wholly completed 
constitutional violation com­
mitted by a government actor, 
and situations where litigants 
say they are subject to an on­
going constitutional violation 
based on an unlawful law or 
policy that affects (or could af­
fect) others. 
In the former situation, 
where the harm cannot be un­
done, the only thing a court 
can do is to provide a substi­
tute remedy. Examples of 
substitute remedies include 
the suppression of unconstitu­
tionally obtained evidence, a 
money damage award, and a 
new trial untainted by the er­
ror that rendered an earlier 
trial unconstitutional. 
But before ordering a sub­
stitute remedy, the court must 
apply doctrines designed to 
weigh its likely negative ef­
fects on the public - e.g., the 
suppression of evidence that 
might let a dangerous crimi­
nal go free - against the per­
ceived need for a remedy. Of­
ten, these doctrines will com­
pel the court to conclude that 
the costs of ordering a rem­
edy are simply too high. 
But in the latter situation, 
where the harm is ongoing, 
the court can issue a decree 
that stops it and declares un­
constitutional the law or pol­
icy upon which it is based. 
Courts will not deny a remedy 
in such situations. Indeed, 
one of the basic functions of 
courts (and judicial review) is 
to deactivate unconstitutional 
laws and policies. 
OK, finally, let's suppose 
that we have a litigant with 
standing who alleges ongoing 
harm from an unconstitu­
tional law or policy. Even in 
such situations, the path to a 
remedy may be blocked. 
Before holding that a coor­
dinate branch of the federal 
government or a state is vio­
lating the Constitution, the 
court often must apply doc­
trines that require it to show 
deference to the governmen­
tal unit whose conduct is be­
ing challenged. 
Under these deference 
doctrines, the court should 
not find a constitutional viola­
tion unless the underlying evi­
dence of the violation is very 
clear. Thus, the Supreme 
Court will not lightly conclude 
that the president's "travel 
ban" is motivated by unlawful 
discrimination, and lower 
courts will not easily find that 
the president's voter-fraud 
commission is a sham. 
So, can the courts save us 
from unconstitutional govern­
ment conduct? The answer is, 
only sometimes. More often, 
any "remedy" lies in the next 
election. 
(John Greabe teaches con­
stitutional law and related 
subjects at the University of 
New Hampshire School of 
Law. He also serves on the 
board oftrustees ofthe New 
Hampshire Institute for 
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